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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the two last decades, economists have devoted more and more atten-
tion to the patterns of firm entry and exit in the modern economies. 
The theoretical approach to this phenomenon focuses on the process of 
creative destruction from an evolutionary perspective (Baldwin, 1995; 
Geroski, 1995; Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995). It considers that 
firms are heterogeneous and that the shift in the distribution of firms 
by industry that takes place via firm turnover is mostly driven by tech-
nological progress. However, the ability of firms to survive and develop 
also depends on institutional and regulatory settings. In OECD countries, 
public and private institutions have set up a large range of services and 
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forms of support to help start-ups and small firms to survive and develop 
(see Beason and Weinstein, 1996, for Japan; Gu et al., 2006, for the USA; Oh 
et al., 2009, for Korea; Wren and Storey, 2002, and Harris and Robinson, 
2004, for the UK; Pfeiffer and Reise, 2000, and Caliendo and Künn, 2011, 
for Germany).
In this paper, we assess the impact of a program of public support (ACCRE, 
aide aux chômeurs créant ou reprenant une entreprise) on start-up survival in the 
French economy. We use a rich matched database of a cohort of French 
firms that were created in the first half of 1998. We follow these firms 
year by year over the 1998-2006 period. This database enables us to control 
not only for the characteristics of new firms, but also for entrepreneurs 
background (e.g., education, previous experience and position on the labor 
market before starting the new business). Because public support may not 
be randomly distributed, we use a propensity score matching method to 
control for selection bias and estimate the effect of public support on the 
probability of start-ups to survive and to develop.
Our results show that subsidized start-ups are more likely to survive than 
non-subsidized firms after their first two years of existence. We also dis-
tinguish different subgroups of firms, according to their initial capital 
and their funding sources. We find that this positive impact on firm sur-
vival is equally distributed among these different subgroups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
effect of public support on firm survival and economic performance, and 
studies why should public authorities target some categories of people, and 
support them to start their own business. Section 3 analyzes how public 
authorities support start-ups in France. Section 4 describes the database 
and explains our econometric strategy. Section 5 presents and interprets 
our results. Section 6 concludes.
2. FIRM DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT 
FOR NEW FIRMS
In all developed countries, firm demography is characterized by high entry 
and exit rates (Bartelsman et al., 2003). Because these two phenomena tend 
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to offset each other, the static view of the enterprise demography is very 
different from the dynamic view. Among a cohort of new business, 90% 
survive the first year following entry (Déprez, 2010), 55% survive five 
years after entry, and approximately 45% remain seven years after entry 
(table 3 hereafter). This turnover is part of the creative destruction pro-
cess: for a given market, a substantial proportion of firm entrants replace 
a similar proportion of those which exit. In the context of firms’ ability to 
adapt to their economic environment, some are able to grow and survive, 
while the others are obliged to exit the market (Jovanovic, 1982). This pro-
cess of creative destruction is analyzed through the heterogeneity among 
firm characteristics and behavior, which results in permanent changes in 
the composition of their population (Baldwin, 1995).
The importance of the creation and of the dynamics of new firms explain 
why assistance to start-ups has become an important part of the employ-
ment policy in developed countries. Gu et al. (2008) single out sixteen main 
programs in the U.S.: Nine are devoted to assistance (entrepreneurship 
and management training, consulting, services), two to loan supply and 
credit guarantee, two to grants, and three are jointly devoted to business 
assistance and loan supply. Most of these programs target people who are 
considered as disadvantaged in economic competition because of their eth-
nic origin, their gender or their geographical location.
Recent research use econometric methods that are designed to eliminate 
selection bias and evaluate whether the difference in the startup out-
comes can be attributed to public support. Here after, we briefly review 
research which is focused on unemployed people who start a new busi-
ness in Germany and in France where this sort of support is well devel-
oped.
Pfeiffer and Reize (2000) study the effect of public subsidies on the sur-
vival of firms created by unemployed people in eastern and western 
Germany. According to the Labor Promotion Law (August 1994), unem-
ployed people who start a business may receive “bridging allowances” 
(BA). These allowances are subsidies which are granted for a period of 
six months to the new entrepreneur and which equal the benefits she or 
he would have received if unemployed. Unexpectedly, estimations show 
that, after their first year of existence, the firms created by unemployed 
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people that receive public support in eastern Germany have a lower prob-
ability of survival than others. The same pattern is not observed for west-
ern Germany. The authors explain this paradoxical result for eastern 
Germany by an opportunistic behavior or “cash and carry effect”: some 
people receiving public subsidies when creating their businesses only 
want to get the financial support and close their business soon after. 
However, Pfeiffer and Reize (2000) analyze business survival one year 
after creation and Almus (2001) studies the same sample of firms, but 
extends the period of research to five years. He finds that, in eastern 
Germany, firm survival and employment growth are positively related 
to the receipt of public subsidies. According to his conclusions, five years 
after firm creation, the effect of public support overcomes the cash and 
carry effect.
In addition, Caliendo and Künn (2011) study the effect of the “bridging 
allowance” (BA) program and another “Start-Up Subsidy” (SUS) program 
in Germany during a more recent period (2003-2008). The institutional 
rules of the BA program have not changed since the 90s (see above our 
comments on Pfeiffer and Reize’s research). The second program con-
sists of a lump-sum payment which is granted to unemployed people who 
start a business. Participants in the SUS program are on average younger 
and lower educated individuals with less employment duration and lower 
earnings in the past than the participants to the BA program. Both pro-
grams proved to improve the unemployed people situation on the labor 
market. More specifically the outcome of the SUS program increased the 
probability of the participants to be employed or self-employed five years 
after the start of their business.
Using French data, Crépon and Duguet (2003) study the effect of subsi-
dies from public administration and loans from banks on firms created in 
1994 during the subsequent three years. The main public subsidy is a lump 
sum1 that is granted to unemployed people who start a new business. They 
estimate a multinomial logit model of the financial structure of each new 
business distinguishing between public subsidies, bank loans and a com-
bination of both. Then they use a matching process to compare firm sur-
vival according to their financial resources. They find a positive effect of 
1 It amounts to 32,000 Francs or approximately 5,000 Euros.
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this subsidy on start-up survival be they created by short-term or long-
term unemployed people. In addition, bank loans reinforce the effect of 
public subsidies on firm survival.
Cabannes and Fougere (2013) evaluate the effect of the ACCRE program2 
on the start-up life duration using the SINE (Système d’Information sur 
les Nouvelles Enterprises) survey on the 1998-2003 period. They estimate 
a two equations model with random effects. The first equation formal-
izes the probability to participate in the ACCRE program, and the second 
the start-up life duration. The objective of this method is to eliminate the 
selection bias (government bodies may select “the best projects”) and the 
auto-selection bias (some entrepreneurs may be well informed, others may 
not be). For those entrepreneurs who were unemployed for less than one 
year before starting their business, they find no effect of the ACCRE pro-
gram on the life duration of this business. They conclude that the selec-
tion process by government bodies for this category of entrepreneur is 
effective. However, they cannot conclude for the entrepreneurs who were 
unemployed for more than one year before starting their business: “proba-
bly because of an inappropriate specification of the decision to participate 
in the program”.
Thus, there is a general evolution in developed countries for public author-
ities to assist or (and) finance those people who create new firms espe-
cially when there are members of disadvantaged groups. How can these 
programs be justified from a theoretical point of view?
First, if the credit market is imperfect, or if banks are reluctant to finance 
start-ups, especially if their size is small, which is the case in general 
when disadvantaged people create a firm, financing by public authorities 
may be efficient. It removes the constraint originating from credit ration-
ing for this category of firms. However, theoretically, only loan supplies 
or credit guarantee by public authorities are justified, but grants and sub-
sidies are not.
Second, some groups may be discriminated on the labour market. 
Discrimination may emerge from the employers’ “taste for discrimination” 
2 In section 3 here after, we present the conditions of eligibility and support of this 
program.
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(Becker, 1971). Moreover, employers may not observe the individual char-
acteristics of people on the labour market, so their decisions are based on 
beliefs or prejudices about the average characteristics of the members of 
social groups (defined by their gender, their race, their age, their posi-
tion on the labour market). In any case, discrimination has a negative 
effect on a nation’s welfare, since people who are discriminated under-
invest in their education. Scholarships in many countries can be inter-
preted as subsidies which are granted by public authorities to increase the 
return on education of discriminated people, and hence their investment 
in their own education. By the same way, public authorities may envisage 
to grant financial support to those groups of people who under-invest in 
their business for lack of personal financial resources, or lack of access to 
bank loans. In this respect, subsidizing the creation of new firms by disad-
vantaged people can be a good instrument to escape from discrimination 
on the labour market (Lofstrom, 2002). First, self-employed people create 
their own job, so they are free from any discrimination on the labour mar-
ket from employers. Second, subsidies may counterbalance their individ-
ual lack of financial resources to start their business in a world where 
financial markets are not perfect.
3. HOW DOES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
SUPPORT START-UPS CREATED 
BY UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE IN FRANCE?
In this paper we use a sample of new firms that is representative of all 
firms which were created in France in 1998. We study the effect of pub-
lic subsidies on their survival. These public programs were especially 
targeted towards people who were not employed before starting their 
business.
The most important program was called the ACCRE (Aide aux chômeurs 
Créant ou reprenant une entreprise)3. This was a special program for 
people who were not employed and who started or took over a firm 
(table 1). 42.9% of this category of entrepreneurs received the ACCRE in 
1998 (table 2).
3 Support to unemployed people who start or takeover a firm.
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Table 1. Conditions of eligibility and support  
by the ACCRE program in 1998
Entry conditions: 
people who are 
eligible
-Unemployed people be they eligible to unemployment benefits or 
not.
-Minimum social income recipients.
For these two categories of people: approval of the business plan 
by the labor administration (ministry of labor at the local level) 
is required.
Support -For those people who are eligible to unemployment benefits: if 
they are not paid by their start-up, they continue to receive their 
unemployment benefits for a maximum of fifteen months. If their 
business fails, their right to unemployment benefits is taken into 
account from the date when they started their business. If they 
are compensated by their new business they are exempted from 
social contributions for a one-year period.
-Unemployed persons who are not eligible to unemployment bene-
fits are also exempted from social contributions on their pay for a 
one-year period.
-Recipients of minimum income (RMI, API) continue to receive 
their minimum income for one year after the creation of their busi-
ness if they are not compensated. If they are compensated, they are 
exempted from social contributions on their pay during one year. 
Source: Daniel, Mandelblat (2010).
Moreover people who started a new business were entitled to benefit from 
other programs which include different tax cuts and social contribution 
exemptions that were usually decided at the local or regional level4. Nine 
different programs are reported in our database, and each of them con-
cerned a small percentage of the new entrepreneurs. This is the reason 
why we only focus our analysis on the ACCRE program, and the people 
who were entitled to receive it: the people who did not work before start-
ing their business. Thus we have 4594 entrepreneurs in our sample, 42.9% 
of them participated in the ACCRE program (table 2). A small proportion 
(9.1%) of those who participated in the ACCRE program also benefited from 
other public programs. In 1998, the ACCRE was devoted to jobless persons 
who started a business, whatever the legal status of their new firm and 
the entrepreneur’s personal status (according to French legislation, he or 
she can be a wage earner, a professional, or a self-employed person).
4 The most important of these taxes is the “taxe professionnelle”, which is levied by 
local authorities.
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Table 2. Subsidies to new firms in France (1998)
Total Percentage of those 
which received 
public subsidies1 
Percentage of those 
which received the 
ACCRE
New firms in the 
sample: total 
9359 36.0 22.5
The new entrepreneur 
was employed before 
starting his business 
4765 20.5 3.02
The new entrepreneur 
was not employed before 
starting his business 
4594 52.0 42.9
1. This includes all forms of public subsidies: the ACCRE, tax and social contributions 
exemptions by local authorities.
2.3% of those who were employed participated in the ACCRE program. Indeed, according 
to the legislation, these persons were already dismissed by their employer, but still work-
ing for a short period (three months). They are excluded from our econometric analysis.
Sources: Our Sine and Ficus database, see section 4 here after.
The underlying conception of this support was that unemployment and 
inactivity may be negative signals on the labor market for those who look 
for a job. The general objective of the ACCRE program was to help jobless 
people by supporting their new business, and thus allow them to “cre-
ate their own job”. In addition, the support was concentrated on the first 
year of existence of the new business, a period when the risk of failure 
is the highest (table 3). The ACCRE program was first created in 1977. The 
main provisions of this program have changed many times (Daniel and 
Mandelblat, 2010; Mouriaux, 1995). At the origin, this program was focused 
on registered unemployed people. The support was a lump-sum payment 
corresponding to the benefits they would have received if they had been 
unemployed instead of starting their business. 
This program has been progressively extended to “disadvantaged persons”: 
unemployed people who were not entitled to benefits, people who received 
minimum income or allowances from public administration (table 1, RMI, 
API)5. If we consider the 1998 provisions (table 1), the support by the ACCRE 
5 RMI is a minimum income which is roughly equal to half the minimum wage 
(450 Euros a month) and which also depends on the number of persons of the bene-
ficiary’s family. API is a special allowance for the single parent of young children.
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program was not equally distributed among these different categories of 
recipients. People who received unemployment benefits before starting 
their business took the largest advantage of the ACCRE. According to this 
regulation, if they did not receive a pay from their new business, they 
kept their right to receive their employment benefits for a maximum of 
fifteen months. Unemployed people had an additional support (were they 
eligible to unemployment benefits or not): if they were compensated by 
their new business, they were exempted from social contributions on their 
pay during one year.
A second category of persons were entitled to participate in the ACCRE 
program: those who receive minimum social income from public adminis-
tration. If they were not compensated by their start-ups they would con-
tinue to receive their minimum social income during one year. If they 
were compensated, they were also exempted from social contribution on 
the pay they received from their new business. A study by the French 
Ministry of Labor (Ould Younes, 2010) gives information about the people 
who were supported by the ACCRE program at the end of the 90s. 62% of 
them were registered unemployed and received benefits before starting 
their business, 11.7% were unemployed without benefits, 20.7% received 
minimum income (5.6% were included in ‘other categories’).
Those who were entitled to receive unemployment benefits for the first fif-
teen months of their business were a majority. In our database (section 4), 
the only available information concerns the entrepreneurs who partici-
pated (or not participated) in the ACCRE program. However, since accord-
ing to the French legislation, unemployed benefits were proportional to 
the last wage paid before unemployment, the range of the subsidies which 
were granted to these people was presumably large.
4. THE DATA AND ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
4.1. The Data Sources
In this paper, we match two data sources from INSEE (the French Institute 
of Statistics): an entrepreneur survey (SINE) and an administrative data-
base (FICUS). The objective of the SINE (“système d’information sur les nouvelles 
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enterprises”) survey was to follow a generation of newly created firms over 
a period of five years. We concentrate on the 1998 cohort (for the firms 
which were created during the first semester). Our sample consists of 
30,000 firms and is representative of all firms created during this period. 
Sample firms were surveyed three times: early in the entry process, three 
years and five years after their creation. The firms surveyed operate in 
the manufacturing, construction, trade and service sectors (except finan-
cial activities). SINE included micro-firms, in particular those in the ser-
vice sector, which represented the majority of start-ups: nearly 60% of 
new firms were created in the trade and other service sectors (table A1 in 
appendix). 73% of firms in the sample had only one self-employed person 
or one wage-earner6, 90% of them had no more than two self-employed 
persons or employees. We only retained “ex-nihilo creations” in our sam-
ple – that is, firms that used new means of production.
The administrative dataset FICUS gives information for all firms that are 
subject to the two major French tax regimes. These regimes cover virtu-
ally the entire productive system, representing roughly 95 percent of tax-
able firms in terms of sales. The data we use concern the period from 
1998 to 2006. For each year, we have a sample of approximately 2.5 mil-
lion firms (including all firms producing goods or services, be they newly 
created or not).
4.2. The Matched Database
The French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies registers 
all type of new firms with an identification number (SIREN). This identi-
fier is the same in the SINE and the FICUS database. This common identi-
fier has been used to match the two databases. The matched database con-
tains 9359 start-ups7 and an important amount of information, including 
both entrepreneur and firm characteristics (economic and financial vari-
ables). It also gives the opportunity to follow firms from birth to potential 
death, namely from 1998 to 2006. Some firms created in 1998 only appear 
6 In France in 1998, there was no legal differentiation between firms with and with-
out wage earners (in the latter case, there is only one self-employed person).
7 The robustness of our estimations to the attrition bias has been tested, see appen-
dix B.
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in FICUS in 1999 due to delays in administrative record keeping. In con-
trast, some firms are still recorded even after they have failed. We have 
deleted all such firms. We have focused our analysis on entry without con-
sidering takeovers or juridical transformations.
Table 3 presents the firm survival rate in our sample over the 1998-2006 
period. It shows that 56.9% of firms survived five years, and 45.3% eight 
years after their creation. These results are consistent with the literature 
(Bartelsman et al., 2003).
Table 3. Survival rates of different categories of firms  
created in 1998 (in %)
Total number 
of firms in 
the sample, 
n = 9359 (1) 
Firms created by 
persons who were 
not employed before 
starting their business, 
n = 4594 (2) 
Among them 
(2), persons who 
received the 
ACCRE, n = 1960
Among them 
persons who did 
not receive the 
ACCRE, n = 2634
1999 90.3 88.6 90.8 85.9
2000 79.2 76.0 79.1 73.6
2001 66.7 62.0 68.6 57.0
2002 61.7 56.8 64.2 51.2
2003 56.9 51.9 59.4 46.3
2004 52.9 47.8 54.7 42.6
2005 47.9 42.9 50.3 37.4
2006 45.3 40.6 47.6 35.3
Survival rate in year t: ratio of the number of firms which are still in existence in year t 
divided by the number of firms which were operating at the end of 1998. 
Source: 1998-2006 FICUS, and 1998 SINE Survey.
On average firms created by persons who were not employed before starting 
their business have a lower survival rate all over the period than those who 
were created by persons who were employed. In that sense, they belong to 
the group of these disadvantaged persons which is targeted by the ACCRE 
program. Those who were supported by the ACCRE program have a sur-
vival rate which is slightly higher than the average of the total number of 
firms, and is much higher than the rate of jobless people who were not sup-
ported. But at this stage of our analysis, it cannot be said that the ACCRE 
has reached its objective, since these results may be biased by the admin-
istrative selection process which grants the public support (see section 5).
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4.3. Descriptive Analysis
In table A1 in the appendix, we present descriptive statistics about the char-
acteristics of the individuals who participated in the ACCRE program and 
those who did not. Among men 45.9% participated, against 35.7% for women. 
Those who were above 50 years of age (23%) participated less than those 
under 50 (44.7%). People with a basic level of education (31.9%), and at the 
opposite with post-secondary and university level of education (39.2), partic-
ipated less than people with an upper secondary level of education (54.5%). 
If we consider occupational skills, before starting their business people with 
a semi-skilled or low skill occupations (foremen: 66.5%, blue collars: 56.6%, 
and white collars: 51.1%) participated more than highly qualified persons 
(managers: 42.9%), craftsmen and shopkeepers (25.6%) and former students 
(18.5%). It must be kept in mind (table 1) that the ACCRE program was mostly 
devoted to people who received unemployment benefits before starting their 
business, that is who were wage-earners before being unemployed.
If we consider the capital invested in the start-ups, only those with a very 
small capital (less than 1 500 Euros) and with a large capital (more than 
75 000 Euros) had a relatively low level of participation in the ACCRE pro-
gram (respectively: 29.3% and 32.7%). In addition, 58.8% of those who bor-
rowed money to a bank participated in the ACCRE program. On aver-
age, the entrepreneurs who participate in the program had a firm with a 
smaller employment (1.3 job, including self-employed and employees), than 
those who did not participate (1.7 job). If we only take into account employ-
ees, the corresponding figures were 0.3 and 0.8 job on average. Moreover, 
participation in the program was higher for the manufacturing and build-
ing industries than for the service activities. At the geographical level, 
the percentage of participants in the district of Paris was particularly low 
(19.1%)8. And finally, among those who participated in other forms of pub-
lic support to firm creation (section 3), 61.9% participated in the ACCRE 
program, and 38.1% did not. We shall have of course to take this last obser-
vation into account in our estimations (section 5).
To sum up, when examining the descriptive statistics, it does not appear that 
the ACCRE program was especially devoted to disadvantaged people (with a 
8 This phenomenon is acknowledged and studied in details by Daniel and Mandelblat 
(2010).
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low level of education, low capital investment) but rather to people who are 
close to the average of the characteristics of the population under survey. If 
we consider the occupations and skills, a majority of those who were fore-
men, technicians, blue collars and white collars and who were wage-earn-
ers before being unemployed participated in the ACCRE program. This result 
is linked to the legislation: unemployed people who received benefits before 
starting their business continued to receive these benefits if they were not 
compensated for the first 15 months of their firm existence. This was an 
attractive advantage for this category of entrepreneur.
4.4. Econometric Strategy and Treatment 
of the Selection Bias
In this paper, we evaluate the effect of the ACCRE program on firm sur-
vival. We define the rate of survival of the firms at the end of the year t as 
the ratio of the number of firms which survive in t divided by the number 
of firms which were in operation at the end of the year 1998. Entrepreneurs 
who received start-up subsidies may not be randomly distributed: we may 
hypothesize that public administration decided to grant subsidies based on 
entrepreneurs profiles and project prospects. It is possible that this adminis-
tration chose those people who had the best prospect to survive and develop 
their business. Thus, subsidized start-ups faced a selection process that 
depended on observable and unobservable entrepreneurs’ characteristics.
But, at the opposite, the ACCRE program may attract people who would not 
have started a business if they were not entitled to receive this subsidy. 
Since this support was devoted to disadvantaged people, it is possible that 
the beneficiaries had characteristics (education, professional skills, previ-
ous status on the labor market, invested capital) which, other things being 
equal, had a negative impact on their business’ success. In other words, 
there may be a self-selection bias in the evaluation of the effects of subsi-
dies on firm survival.
Different econometric methods have been used to try to eliminate these 
biases. In some research (Cabannes and Fougère, 2013, see above section 2, 
Wren and Storey, 2002), firm life duration is modeled by a hazard func-
tion. The advantage of this method is that the time unit is the number of 
days of firm life, rather than the number of years which are taken into 
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account in our survival approach. However, we did not use this life dura-
tion model for lack of relevant data (in our data base, we only know if 
firms are still working or not, at the end of each year).
Brown and Earle (2013) estimate the effect of the US SBA loan program on 
job creation using matching methods in the first step of their research. 
In the second step, they use a firm level panel data which includes those 
firms which received a loan from the SBA on the one hand, and the firms 
of the control group which have been selected by the matching process 
on the other hand. The panel regression uses a difference in difference 
method to eliminate the influence of unobservable variables. This method 
is very interesting but cannot be applied to our own research. Indeed, 
these authors exclude from their analysis start-ups because their method 
necessitates longitudinal data (at least two years before the reception of 
the SBA loan). For the same reason (no data before the start-up birth) we 
cannot apply this difference in difference method to our sample.
Other research which focuses on the efficiency of public subsidies on 
start-ups uses matching methods “à la Rubin” (Rubin, 1974; Rubin and 
Rosenbaum, 1983). This is the case of Crépon and Duguet (2003) who study 
the effect of the ACCRE program on the cohort of business which started 
in 1994, and Caliendo and Künn (2011) who compare the BA program and 
the SUS program in Germany (see section 2 here above). For reason of data 
availability, and of relevance of the method to the evaluation of public pol-
icy, we also use this method. Here after, we present the main characteris-
tics of this method and its limits.
To control for the possible biases, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) 
method (Rubin, 1974; Heckman et al., 1999). The aim of this method is to 
build a control group from the population of entrepreneurs who do not par-
ticipate in the ACCRE program and to ensure that this control group is as 
similar as possible to the group of entrepreneurs who gets start-up subsidies. 
In our database there are n firms (with i = 1…..n), we identify each firm 
participation in the ACCRE program in 1998 with a dummy variable ACi. 
Thus, if a firm is treated by the ACCRE program: ACi = 1. The impact of 
the ACCRE program on firm survival is measured with the outcome varia-
ble y
i
. Each firm presents two possible results: y(0)
i (if ACi = 0) and y(1)i (if 
ACi = 1). These two latent variables correspond to the potential results of 
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the firm depending on its participation (or non participation) to the pro-
gram. They are never simultaneously observed for a firm i.




 = ACi y(1)i – (1 – ACi) y(0)i)
Only the couple (y
i
, ACi) is observed for each firm.







This is an individual effect which is unobservable. Thus the statistical dis-
tribution of this effect cannot be identified. However, under certain con-




, ACi), certain 
parameters of the distribution of the causal effect can be identified and, 
among them, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Heckman 
et al., 1997, Heckman et al. 1999, Heckman and Navarro Lazano, 2004). One 
of these conditions is the conditional independence assumption (CIA), 
which states that conditional on observable characteristics (xi), the coun-
terfactual outcome is independent of treatment.
Moreover, independence of potential outcome from treatment, conditional 
to the set of variables xi, is equivalent to independence of the propensity 
score P(xi) which corresponds to a one-dimensional summary of matching 
variables and which estimates the probability of being exposed to treat-
ment (Rubin and Rosenbaum, 1983).
This Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method is well adapted to the eval-
uation of the impact of the programs that support firm survival and devel-
opment. It distinguishes those firms which have been “treated” by these 
programs and those which have not been (among the papers which use 
this method, see: Caliendo and Künn, 2011; Fajnzylber et al., 2006; Girma 
et al. 2010; Oh et al., 2009). However, theoreticians (Heckman and Navarro 
Lazano, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005) point out that estimates based on 
PSM method are highly sensitive to the set of variables included in the 
score. They also stress that the CIA is crucial and the applicability of the 
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matching estimator depends heavily on it. The plausibility of this assump-
tion must be studied on a case by case basis. In our research, thanks to 
the very detailed database that we use, we take into account the charac-
teristics of the individuals which may influence their participation to the 
ACCRE program, as well as the economic and financial characteristics of 
their start-ups. We also distinguish different sub-groups of firms to check 
the robustness of the CIA (see sub-section 5.3. hereafter).
The outcome variable we introduce in our estimations is a dummy: the 
survival rate of each firm after its first year until its eighth year of exist-
ence. In the first step of our estimation strategy, we estimate a logit model 
which is the basis of the propensity score method. The dependant varia-
ble is the participation (or not) in the ACCRE program which is related to 
the characteristics of the firms and of the entrepreneurs who have created 
them. In the second step, we use matching methods to estimate the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated by the ACCRE program. We distinguish 
short term and long term effects on firm survival.
5. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS
5.1. Participation in the ACCRE Program
The probability to participate in the ACCRE program is formalized by a 
logit model (table 4). The aim is to single out the factors of entrepreneurs’ 
participation in this program. Two categories of factors are considered.
a. The variables which are supposedly taken into account by Government 
bodies to decide (or not) to support entrepreneurs: legal status, means to 
finance the business (including loans by banks and other public subsidies), 
previous creation of firms (government bodies may be reluctant to finance 
multi-creators), number of jobs in the new business, and activity category.
b. Entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics may also determine their par-
ticipation. Indeed the importance of the support by the program depends 
on the occupation of the entrepreneurs before starting their business and 
being unemployed (wage-earner or not) (section 3). Other personal factors 
which may influence the decision to participate are gender, age, and level 
of education.
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Table 4. Entrepreneurs Participation in the ACCRE program  
(logit model) (ACCRE = 1 for the entrepreneurs who participate  
in the program, ACCRE = 0 for those who do not)
Nationality (refer: foreigner)
French 
Gender (refer : women)
Men 
Age bracket (refer: 16 to 50) 
More than 50 years
Education (refer: basic)
Lower and middle secondary
Professional upper secondary
Non Professional upper 
second.
Post secondary and university
Occupation before starting 










Number of previous 
creations




Collaboration (refer.: with 
former employer, a family 
member…)
No collaboration
Market research before 

























Capital investment to start 
(refer. less than 1500 euros)
From 1500 to 3500 euros
From 3500 to 7000 euros
From 7000 to 15000 euros
From 15000 to 37000 euros
From 37000 to 75000 euros
More than 75000 euros
Legal status (ref. corporation)
Self-employed
Number of jobs (self-employed 
and wage earners)
Means of financing the 
business (ref. with personal 
contribution and bank loan)
With bank loan and no personal 
resources
With personal resources and no 
bank loan
With no bank loan and no 
personal resources.









Education and health services
Start-up located in the district 
of Paris (in %) (ref. outside 
the district)
In the district of Paris
Received another public 

























Number of observations 4594 Log likelihood -2427.70
Number of participants in the 
ACCRE program 
1960 Pseudo R2 0.225
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998.
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, 
respectively.
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Men have not a higher probability to participate than women (table 4). 
People with a basic or lower level of education, as well as those with a 
post-secondary and university level, have a lower probability to partici-
pate than those with an upper secondary level of education. Those who 
were wage earners (executive, foreman, blue and white collars) before 
being unemployed and starting their business have a higher probability to 
participate than those who were not wage earners (businessmen, crafts-
men, students). Also those who entered into collaboration with other per-
sons to run their business and who studied their market before starting 
have a higher probability to receive the ACCRE. If we consider the new 
business legal status, those who set up a company have a lower probabil-
ity to participate in the program than those who start their own business.
We pay particular attention to the initial capital investment and the 
means of financing the new business. If we consider the former, com-
pared with a very small capital investment (less than 1 500 Euros), there 
is a wide range of projects (between 1 500 and 75 000 Euros) which have a 
higher probability to be selected. But it is noteworthy that there is no sig-
nificant difference in the probability to be selected among these projects. 
Finally, very big projects (initial capital higher than 75 000 Euros) had 
a probability to participate which was not significantly higher than the 
very small projects.
In addition the probability to participate in the ACCRE program is pos-
itively related to the existence of bank loans and financial personal 
resources by the new entrepreneurs. We have investigated in depth this 
question, and built interaction variables. These variables (bank loans 
interrelated with personal resources of the new entrepreneur) introduced 
in the logit estimation show that the effect of the bank loan on the prob-
ability to participate in the ACCRE program is higher than the personal 
resources of the new businessmen (table 4). Other interaction variables 
(between the initial capital and bank loans) show that businessmen who 
receive bank loans have a higher probability to participate even if their 
initial capital is small9.
Moreover people who start their business in the food or manufacturing 
industries or the business services or personal services have a higher 
9 These estimations not reported here can be obtained from the authors upon request.
LONG TERM EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON START-UP SURVIVAL …
REVUE D ’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 149  ➻  1ER TR IMESTRE 2015 29
probability to participate in the program than in the other activities. 
Finally, the participation in the ACCRE program is positively linked with 
the participation in other public programs to support start-ups. We shall 
have to take carefully into account this fact in our estimation of the effects 
of the ACCRE program on firm survival here after.
5.2. The effect of the ACCRE Program on Firm 
Survival
Table 5 reports the firm survival rate after one to eight years of existence. 
We use the estimates of the logit equation which is reported in table 4 and 
that we have analyzed here above. Then we implement the Kernel match-
ing method which introduces weighted averages of firms in the control 
group to construct the counterfactual outcome.
After matching, the impact of the ACCRE program on firm survival is 
positive. Only at the end of 1999, this impact is not significant (whereas 
it is significant with the unmatched data). Such a difference between the 
short-term and long-term effects of public support on start-up survival 
has already been found in research aiming at evaluating the efficiency 
of these policies in different countries (section 2). In France, if the new 
entrepreneurs’ income is low, and if they receive unemployment bene-
fits, it is their interest to close their business after their first twelve or 
fifteen months of activity. It is noteworthy that, for new entrepreneurs, 
the right to keep unemployment benefits, which is an incentive to start 
a new business, may also be an incentive to give it up after twelve or fif-
teen months, if they consider that their business income is low compared 
to the unemployment benefits they continue to receive after closing their 
business.
However, after two years of existence (2000), the impact of the ACCRE on 
firm survival is positive and significant. Between the fourth and eighth 
year (2002-2006), the difference is constant and very close to 0.1: in 2006, 
after matching, the survival rate of the control group is 0.376 and 0.474 
for the treated group. This result is all the more important that it con-
cerns the long term effect of the ACCRE, seven years after the end of this 
program.
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Table 5. Estimates of firm survival rate for different periods before 
and after matching (Kernel matching method)
Period (end 
of each year)
Treated : participate 
in the ACCRE program




























































































Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998.
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, 
respectively.
5.3. Tests of robustness (see also appendix B)
From a technical point of view, it must be mentioned that all the estima-
tions (tables 5 and 6) have been carried out using the Kernel matching 
method. This method has been chosen since it displays a higher common 
support than any other method. Only 0.6% of the observations are off the 
support.
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The balancing test of these first results estimates the difference between 
the variables of the treated and the control samples before and after the 
matching process. It confirms the validity of the matching method which 
reduces the difference between most of these variables by more than 
90%10.
We have also tested alternative matching methods: (i) We use a nearest-
neighbor method with and without replacement. (ii) We also used a dif-
ferent definition of the distance between each pair of matched observa-
tions: the Mahalanobis distance. All these estimations give results which 
are very close to the Kernel estimations11.
The standard errors on the difference between the averaged treatment on 
the treated and the controls which are presented in tables 5 and 6 have 
been computed using the standard method. These standards errors have 
also been computed using the bootstrap method. This last method displays 
results which are very close to the former.
Moreover following Black and Smith (2004) we define a “thick support” 
in our sample by dropping the treatment observations for which the score 
density is the lowest. Our estimations based on this support do not display 
important changes from the estimation with the full support (appendix B).
5.4. Sub-groups of start-ups according  
to their financial sources
Here after we single out sub-groups of firms according to their initial 
capital and their financing sources, and implement the same estimation 
method. In doing so, we have two objectives. First, we can hypothesize 
that the amount and the source of financing have an impact on new firm 
survival. It is interesting to estimate if the ACCRE program has the same 
effect whatever are the start-up amount and sources of financing. Second, 
these separate estimates are also a means to check the robustness of the 
CIA. Indeed, there may be unobservable characteristics of the firms or 
entrepreneurs in some sub-groups (for example the sub-group of firms 
10 This balancing test is available from the authors upon request.
11 These results are available from the authors.
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which received bank loans), which may bias our estimate across the whole 
sample. This bias may be eliminated if we consider separately different 
sub-groups (for example firms with bank loan on the one hand, and with-
out bank loan on the other).
The first important result is that the ACCRE program has a positive effect 
on firm survival whatever can be the sources of their financing (bank 
loan or personal financial resources). In addition, even those who have 
no bank loan and no personal resources to start their businesses improve 
the probability of their firm survival if they participate in the ACCRE 
program. Another important result is that those who participate in the 
ACCRE program with a small capital investment (less than 7 000 Euros) 
have a significantly higher rate of survival than those who do not partic-
ipate. The result is the same for the start-ups with a capital investment 
larger than 7 000 Euros. Moreover even if the ACCRE program is not cou-
pled with other public subsidies, it has a positive impact on firm survival.
Table 6. Comparing participants and non-participants in the ACCRE 
program: firm survival rate for different subgroups  
of entrepreneurs (Kernel matching method)
Survival rate in 2006 after 8 years 
of existence (Matched data)
Treated : 
participate 
in the ACCRE 
program
Controls Difference Standard 
error 
Means of financing the business,
With personal resources (n=3256)
Without personal resources (n=1338)
With a bank loan (n=1470)
Without a bank loan (n=3124)






















Capital investment to start
-Less than 7000 Euros (n=2108)




















Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998, n = number of firms in each sub-sample.
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, 
respectively.
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Finally, the ACCRE program has a positive effect on firm survival what-
ever can be their sources of financing, and whatever can be their initial 
capital investment. This is undoubtedly an important result since it shows 
that the effect of this program on firm survival is widespread across the 
new firm population. Since financial resources are taken into account in 
the decision process to support start-ups (table 4), this result means that 
public administration does not select the entrepreneurs’ participation to 
the ACCRE program on the basis of their financial resources, their capital 
investment to start their business, and of their participation to other pub-
lic subsidy programs.
Even if other factors of selection bias on unobservable characteristics of 
the entrepreneurs, or of their project, cannot be ruled out with our PSM 
method (section 4), our results suggest that the distribution of ACCRE 
depends at least partly on the legal rules of the ACCRE program rather 
than on economic variables. The self-selection process is working since 
some categories of entrepreneurs have little or no interest in participat-
ing in the program (section 3). For example, entrepreneurs who were 
wage-earners before being unemployed have a higher probability to par-
ticipate in the ACCRE program than non-wage-earners (table 4). Indeed 
the latter are not entitled to receive unemployment benefits during the 
first year of their firm existence. From this point of view, it is interest-
ing to note that until 2007 the decision to accept the participation of 
applicants in the ACCRE program was taken by the local labor admin-
istration (depending on the Labor Ministry). Officially this administra-
tion had to check that the applicants fulfilled legal conditions to bene-
fit from the ACCRE program, and to check the consistency and economic 
prospects of their projects. However, since 2007, according to the new 
regulation, the local chambers of commerce are entitled to take this 
decision checking only that the first condition is fulfilled (Daniel and 
Mandelblat, 2010).
This change is the outcome of a long evolution of the ACCRE program 
which has been more and more devoted to those entrepreneurs who fulfill 
the legal conditions to apply, irrespective of the economic consistency and 
viability of their project.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using the PSM method “à la Rubin”, our results first show that the start-
ups which participated in the ACCRE program had a higher survival rate 
after their second until their eighth year of existence than others. Thus, 
following official objective, this program has a positive effect to help job-
less people to ‘create and keep’ their job in the long run. After eight years, 
according to our estimate, the survival rate for the firm which partici-
pated in the program was 47,4%, compared to 37,6% for those which did 
not participated.
So following other research, we find that the “founding conditions” deter-
mine the start-up long term survival (Geroski et al., 2007). Actually, this 
program mainly consisted of subsidies which alleviated the financial con-
straints of start-ups for a period of twelve to fifteen months. This was a 
very important advantage if we consider that most firms started with a 
very small initial capital investment. To start their activities, firms which 
had higher financial resources (other things being equal) were in a better 
position to survive.
Furthermore, using the same PSM method, and distinguishing different 
sub-groups of entrepreneurs according to their financial resources and the 
amount of their capital investment, we find that the effect of the partici-
pation to the ACCRE program is widespread across these different catego-
ries of entrepreneurs. Our results show that the distribution of ACCRE by 
public authorities depends at least partly on the legal rules of the ACCRE 
program, rather than on economic variables. The entrepreneurs self selec-
tion process is working since some categories of them have little or no 
interest in participating in the program.
As a counterpart the cost of the ACCRE program for government bodies 
consisted of unemployment benefits or social income which were paid to 
new entrepreneurs, or in the reduction of the contributions on wages (for 
those who were paid by the start-ups). However, a complete evaluation of 
the program should take into account the “displacement effect”, namely 
the firms which survived because of their participation in the ACCRE 
program and may have unseated other firms which did not receive this 
support.
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We have also tested the robustness of our results. First we have checked 
that the attrition bias coming from the matching of the two data base 
is very limited. In addition, besides the Kernell matching method 
which is used in most of our estimations, we have introduced other 
matching methods (nearest neighbor with and without replacement, 
Mahalanobis) and find that the results of our estimations do not differ 
significantly.
Finally, the limitations and possible extensions of our study must be out-
lined. First we adopt a partial-equilibrium analysis. That is to say that we 
neglect substitution effects and crowding out effects. Only a general equi-
librium approach could take into account these effects of the program. 
Using other econometric methods (discrete duration models, multinomial 
qualitative models) with more recent and detailed cohorts of the SINE sur-
vey (2002, 2006, 2010) would be another way to check the robustness of 
our results, and to individualize the factors, which, besides public sup-
port, determine start-up survival. Last, the legislation concerning start-up 
subsidies often changes in France. It would be useful to compare different 
start-up cohorts created by jobless people, at different periods, under dif-
ferent institutional settings.
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APPENDIX A. TABLES
Table A1. Selected descriptive statistics for persons who were 
not employed before starting their new business
1998 Persons who 
received the ACCRE 
Persons who did not 
receive the ACCRE 











Less than 51 years







Lower and middle secondary education.
Upper secondary education (professional 
school)
Upper secondary School (non -professional)







































Capital investment to start (in %)
-Less than 1500 euros
-From 1500 to 3500 euros
-From 3500 to 7000 euros
-From 7000 to 15000 euros
-From 15000 to 37000 euros
-From 37000 to 75000 euros
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Average employment
-number of self-employed and employees

































Start-up located in the district of Paris (in %) 19.1 80.9
Other type of public subsidies 61.9 38.1
Sources: 1998-2006 FICUS, and 1998 SINE Survey.
APPENDIX B. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS
First our original data base SINE (section 4) has been merged with the 
FICUS data base. In the original data base, there are 12726 start-ups cre-
ated by unemployed people. After matching with FICUS, there are 4594. 
This attrition comes from the fact that Ficus is an administrative data-
base whereas SINE a statistical survey. To check a possible attrition bias, 
we have compared the results of some estimates before and after match-
ing. In the SINE survey, we have information about the firms which sur-
vived five years after their creation (until 2003) but not after. We thus 
applied the PSM method to the SINE data base before matching (with the 
12756 persons), the outcome variable being their survival (or not) in 1999, 
2000, until 2003. The results of the estimation procedure are very simi-
lar to those that we obtain with the matched data base for the same out-
come variable and the same period (table 6). So we can consider that if 
there is any attrition bias due to the matching of both data base, it is very 
limited.
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Tests of robustness of the estimates of firm survival rate (2006)
Treated : 
participate in the 
ACCRE program
Controls Difference Standard 
error 
PSM, Kernel matching 
method, caliper = 0.0001, 
“thick support” (10%)
0.458 0.379 0.079*** 0.018
PSM, Kernel matching 
method, caliper = 0.0001, 
“thick support” (33%)
0.446 0.371 0.074*** 0.019
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998.
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, 
respectively.
“Thick support: the common support is built by dropping respectively 10% and 33% of 
the treatment observations for which the score density of the control observations is 
the lowest.
Going back to the Kernel method, we have redefined the common sup-
port. Black and Smith (2004) show that a selection process on unobserva-
bles may have its largest effects for values of the propensity score in the 
tails of the distribution. The underlying idea is that when the probabil-
ity to be in the treatment group is high, unobservable factors on average 
have a higher impact than when the probability is around 0.5. Thus Black 
and Smith introduce a “thick support”, by dropping different percentages 
of the treatment observations (in the table of this appendix, respectively 
10% and 33% of the treatment observations have been dropped) at which 
the score density of the control observations is the lowest. Our estimates 
based on this “thick support” are consistent with our previous results, and 
do not display important changes.
In addition we have used a fundamentally different econometric method 
to estimate the effect on start-ups survival of the participation in the 
ACCRE program. For this purpose, we have estimated a bivariate probit 
system12. The first equation formalizes the selection process of the entre-
preneurs who participate (or not) in the ACCRE program. The second pro-
bit equation concerns firm survival. Thus the dependant variable is a 
12 Heckman and Navarro (2004) study how the PSM method and the control function 
method eliminate the selection bias.
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dummy which equals 1 if the firm has survived n years after its creation 
(with n = 1.....8) and 0 if it has not. The first equation includes the same 
variables as in the logit estimation which is the basis of the PSM method 
(table 4 in the text). The second survival equation takes into account the 
interrelation between the participation in the ACCRE program, bank loan 
and the capital investment to start the business. We thus get eight interre-
lated variables which are introduced in this equation. Also we successively 
used two instrumental variables: the location of start-ups in the district 
of Paris (or not), the entrepreneur’s contribution (or not) to the capital 
investment. These two variables are significant determinants of the par-
ticipation in the ACCRE program, but have no effect on firm survival.
The estimation of this biprobit model shows that the participation to the 
ACCRE program has a positive effect on firm survival from their second to 
their eight year of existence13. This confirms the general results that we 
have obtained with the PSM method (table 5 in the text). The results of 
the PSM method are also confirmed for different subgroups of firms: those 
with a large initial capital investment, as well as those with a low initial 
investment, those with a bank loan, as well for those with no bank loan 
(see table 6 in the text for the PSM method) have a higher survival rate if 
they take advantage of the ACCRE program.
13 These estimations are available from the authors upon request.
